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Abstract
Biological systems often detect species-specific signals in the environment. In humans,
speech and language are species-specific signals of fundamental biological importance. To
detect the linguistic signal, human brains must form hierarchical representations from a
sequence of perceptual inputs distributed in time. What mechanism underlies this ability?
One hypothesis is that the brain repurposed an available neurobiological mechanism when
hierarchical linguistic representation became an efficient solution to a computational prob-
lem posed to the organism. Under such an account, a single mechanism must have the
capacity to perform multiple, functionally related computations, e.g., detect the linguistic sig-
nal and perform other cognitive functions, while, ideally, oscillating like the human brain. We
show that a computational model of analogy, built for an entirely different purpose—learning
relational reasoning—processes sentences, represents their meaning, and, crucially, exhib-
its oscillatory activation patterns resembling cortical signals elicited by the same stimuli.
Such redundancy in the cortical and machine signals is indicative of formal and mechanistic
alignment between representational structure building and “cortical” oscillations. By induc-
tive inference, this synergy suggests that the cortical signal reflects structure generation,
just as the machine signal does. A single mechanism—using time to encode information
across a layered network—generates the kind of (de)compositional representational hierar-
chy that is crucial for human language and offers a mechanistic linking hypothesis between
linguistic representation and cortical computation.
Author summary
Human language is a fundamental biological signal with computational properties that
differ from other perception-action systems: hierarchical relationships between sounds,
words, phrases, and sentences and the unbounded ability to combine smaller units into
larger ones, resulting in a "discrete infinity" of expressions. These properties have long
made language hard to account for from a biological systems perspective and within mod-
els of cognition. We argue that a single computational mechanism—using time to encode
hierarchy—can satisfy the computational requirements of language, in addition to those
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of other cognitive functions. We show that a well-supported neural network model of
analogy oscillates like the human brain while processing sentences. Despite being built for
an entirely different purpose (learning relational concepts), the model processes hierarchi-
cal representations of sentences and exhibits oscillatory patterns of activation that closely
resemble the human cortical response to the same stimuli. From the model, we derive an
explicit computational mechanism for how the human brain could convert perceptual
features into hierarchical representations across multiple timescales, providing a linking
hypothesis between linguistic and cortical computation. Our results suggest a formal and
mechanistic alignment between representational structure building and cortical oscilla-
tions that has broad implications for discovering the computational first principles of cog-
nition in the human brain.
Introduction
Detecting relevant signals in the environment is a crucial function in biological systems. For
humans, language is a critical, if not the defining, species-specific environmental signal to
detect. As such, it is not surprising that the human auditory system is specialised for speech
processing [e.g., 1,2]. However, very little is known about the biological mechanisms that
detect the “linguistic signal” within speech (i.e., words, phrases, sentences, meaning), apart
from the fact that that cortical entrainment to the acoustic envelope of speech likely plays a
fundamental role in spoken language comprehension [3,4,5]. In this paper, we show that using
time to encode information about the structural relationship between representations within
the linguistic signal, or time-based binding, can generate the kinds of representations that can
support human language within a layered neural network and produces oscillations that are
highly similar to human cortical signals. By inductive inference, time-based binding, or a for-
mal equivalent, can support language-related cortical computation.
In order to detect linguistic signals in the environment, the human brain requires a compu-
tational system that can generate hierarchical representations from the sequential perceptual
input of speech or text. Generating abstract, higher-level representations like sentences from
either sensory source is likely to rely on simultaneous tracking of multiple levels of the linguis-
tic signal [e.g., 3,6,7,8,9]. However, operating over these multiple levels of signal must be a
mechanism that can compute structured, discrete representations from unstructured continu-
ous input in time—essentially, an operation that can form representations from feature sets, as
in other areas of perception [10,11,12,13]. However, complications arise because human lan-
guage has computational properties that set it apart from other domains of cognition and per-
ception, namely, representation of discrete infinity, arbitrary form-meaning correspondence,
and learnability constraints [12,14,15,16]. One important property is compositionality—when
interpreting a simple sentence like Fun games waste time, being a proposition in human lan-
guage requires that the representation of fun as a discrete word is maintained, even after com-
putation of the phrases Fun games, Fun games waste, and the sentence Fun games waste time.
To make things more complex, this stringent representational requirement holds below, and
beyond, the word-level: both low-level (e.g., phonetic, syllabic, and orthographic) and high-
level (e.g., phrases, sentences, event-structures, discourse) representations have discrete hierar-
chy in the face of compositionality. Linguistic computation in the human brain, therefore,
must generate a representational hierarchy that can represent the compositional product of
input representations while maintaining discrete input units [17,18].
A mechanism for linguistic cortical computation
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Abbreviations: adj, adjective; AdjP, adjective
phrase; DORA, Discovery of Relations by Analogy;
IP, inflectional phrase or sentence; LISA, Learning
and Inference with Schemas and Analogies; NLP,
natural language processing; n, noun; NP, noun
phrase; PO, propositional object; P-unit,
proposition node; RB unit, role-filler binding node;
RNN, recurrent neural network; v, verb; VP, verb
phrase.
Such a representational hierarchy suggests that a first principle of linguistic computation is
a form of relationality: the system must determine whether (or not) to relate and (then com-
pose) input representations with one another. One way to achieve compositionality without
sacrificing information is to represent the relationship between input and output representa-
tions explicitly [18,19]. In a basic sense, this computational situation is akin to that which the
system faces during analogical or relational reasoning, in which the relation between represen-
tations must be computed. For example, when the system must discriminate the conceptual
propositions "John loves Mary" from "Mary loves John," it must discriminate sequences of
identical input arguments that have very different consequents by virtue of their relational
structure [20,21]. Thus, it appears that the encoding of relational structure is a powerful tool
for a biological system that solves the problems that human cognition evolved in response to.
Moreover, from a biological systems perspective, it is highly desirable for a single (cortical,
computational) mechanism to have the capacity to compute over multiple domains, or to
function as a subroutine in multiple cognitive functions [11,22,23,24]. Below, we describe the
computational challenge of (de)compositionality and describe a mechanism that can encode
and preserve hierarchical relational structures from unstructured input within a layered neural
network. Our approach contrasts with extant associative models of speech and language pro-
cessing, cognition, and cortical microcircuits.
If you can understand the sentence Fun games waste time, you typically also know that the
verb waste can combine with phrases other than fun games and nouns other than time without
changing the meaning or syntactic function of waste. One way to achieve this functionality is
to represent waste independently from fun games and time while also generating representa-
tions of the (grammatical) relations between the inputs fun, games, waste, and time. Those rep-
resentations of grammatical relations can then be generatively applied to other inputs. A linear
form of such a representation would be something like:
fffunadjfgamesngNPgADJPfwastevftimengNPgVPgIP ð1Þ
where the most distal level of brackets codes the whole sentence representation, and another
set of brackets codes the adjective, noun, and verb phrases. The curly brackets in Eq (1)
indicate phrasal grouping in an approximation of formal linguistic notation, where
IP = inflectional phrase or sentence, AdjP = adjective phrase, NP = noun phrase, VP = verb
phrase, and adj = adjective, n = noun, v = verb. Fun games is an adjective phrase that contains
the adjective fun and the noun phrase that contains the noun games. That adjective phrase is
composed with a verb phrase, which, itself, is the product of combing the verb waste with the
noun phrase containing the noun time.
In contrast, systems that do not encode relational structures in inputs, such as traditional
recurrent neural networks (RNNs), would represent fun games waste time by creating conjunc-
tive representation, such that {fun} and {games} becomes the holistic {fun games}, losing any
internal distinction between {fun} and {games}. The end product representation would be
something like {fun games waste time}, with no subunit of the sentence being independently
represented. In such a system, {fun games waste time} would bear no relation to {games waste
time} or {games are fun} nor to {long showers waste water} because waste is not represented
independently [25,26]. More generally, systems that use tensor products (the outer product of
two vectors or matrices) to represent or bind stimuli together in the network suffer from the
same problem in that once you bind the two things together in the network, you cannot sepa-
rate them anymore. This pitfall stems from the fact that there are multiple solutions to decom-
posing a tensor into its input vectors—you can never know which solution is "the right one"
for the original input vectors once you have multiplied them. That means you cannot compose
A mechanism for linguistic cortical computation
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and decompose representations in a tensor system without losing information, which is
unsuitable for linguistic representation and for any neural or biological system that must be
both compositional and hierarchical [20].
To circumvent this problem, relational structures can be encoded via binding [13,27]. We
define binding for our purposes here as the representational state where two codes in the net-
work are linked together for processing but where their representations are not defined by this
particular instance of binding. Such a mechanism allows the system to both maintain indepen-
dent representations of input units while also composing the same representations together
during processing, as needed. In sum, our focus here is on the representation of sequences in
which implicit ordinal and time-sensitive relationships matter, and, in fact, may signal the
hierarchical relationships that have been compressed into that sequence. The basic idea is to
encode the elements that are bound in lower layers of a hierarchy directly from the sequential
input and then use slower dynamics to accumulate evidence for relations at higher levels of the
hierarchy. This necessarily entails a memory of the ordinal relationships that, computationally,
requires higher-level representations to integrate or bind lower-level representations over time
—with more protracted activity. This temporal binding mandates an asynchrony of represen-
tation between hierarchical levels of representation in order to maintain distinct, separable
representations despite binding.
Time-based binding in a layered neural network
Here we describe how representations that maintain relational structure can be composed and
decomposed in a layered neural network. A simple computational mechanism, time-based
binding, in which time is used to carry information about the relationships between represen-
tations in the input, is one way to achieve such an architecture. It is a truism and/or a biological
principle of cortical organisation that "neurons that fire together, wire together" [28]. As such,
some time-based binding systems use synchrony of firing to link representations together in
the network for processing [e.g., 29]. Conversely, neurons that do not fire in synchrony can
stay independent, and the proximity in time between firings can be exploited to carry informa-
tion. Discovery of Relations by Analogy (DORA; a symbolic-connectionist model of relational
reasoning; the full computational specifics of the model can be found in Doumas et. al [19],
operating procedure available in Appendix A) exploits the synchrony principle in order to
keep representations separable in the limit while binding them together for processing. This
situation means that the system can be said to have variable-value independence when the
representation of a given variable and its particular value at a moment in time are explicitly,
independently represented [20,30]. A representation of a variable and its value must be able to
function separately in any system performing a computation that requires relationality or (de)
compositionality, such as during analogical reasoning, language processing, and likely many
other higher-level cognition functions [31]. In a system with variable-value independence, sta-
tistics about the association between representations can still play an important role, but those
statistics are not the sole basis of the representational architecture. In other words, variable-
value independence allows the system to represent a variable, its value, and also to compute
statistics about their association without changing the core representations.
In brief, DORA’s primary computational assumptions are (1) a neural network with layers
of units, (2) lateral inhibition, (3) separate banks of units, (4) Hebbian learning, and (5) sen-
sitivity to time. The layered structure of the network, combined with sensitivity to time as
carrying information about the relations between the nodes in the layers of the network, is
one solution to preserving the structure in (1). After learning (please see Appendix A in [19]
and pp. 8–13, 16–21 in the main text), the network represents words, phrases, and sentences
A mechanism for linguistic cortical computation
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across layers of the network, such that words and brackets in (1) correspond to nodes on dif-
ferent layers of the network. Nodes on higher layers code for the composition (a phrase) of
two sublayer nodes (words) and fire when either of the subnodes below it fire in time. Asyn-
chrony of unit firing (in this case, of a node, but in theory, of a neural population or assem-
bly, see [32]) allows the network to bind representations together for processing on a higher
layer while maintaining independent codes for the input representations on a lower layer of
the network. The combination of layers and time-based binding via asynchrony is what
allows the network to have (de)compositionality—representations of compositional product
and the decomposed inputs on different layers of the network. To represent (1), the network
encodes the adjective phrase {funadj{gamesn}NP}ADJP over two layers of the network; on the
lower layer, one node codes for the word {funadj} and another for the word {gamesn}(see Fig
1). On the next layer above that, the phrasal node will activate when the nodes {funadj} and
{gamesn} fire. These word nodes fire staggered in time, or at an asynchrony, and still activate
the node that codes for the phrase {funadj{gamesn}NP}ADJP. A similar configuration codes the
phrasal binding between {wastev} and {timen} (a node that codes the verb phrase {wastev{ti-
men}NP}VP). The relationality between the phrases {funadj{gamesn}NP}ADJP and {wastev{ti-
men}NP}VP is represented by encoding information about being an agent (e.g., "the waster")
or a patient (e.g., "the wasted") in a two-argument predicate. One way to represent predicate
argument relationships in a neural network is to code role information in a separate node
from the particular argument that fills that role at a given processing moment. When the
role slot in a predicate is represented separately from the given input, predicate–argument
relationships can be generatively applied to any input that predicate is associated with in
the dataset (see Fig 1). These argument role nodes, which code for the role-filler binding
relation, can be learned in the same way the word nodes are (see [19] for details). Lastly,
a sentence node that represents the relation between {funadj{gamesn}NP}ADJP and
{wastev{timen}NP}VP as a sentence (a node that fires when the AdjP and VP units fire, and
thus codes for the whole sentence {{funadj{gamesn}NP}ADJP{wastev{timen}NP}VP}IP) is on the
highest layer. The layered structure of the network is a core assumption and is necessary for
time-based binding to function and for predicates to be represented in a connectionist net-
work. We base the assumption that the system has layers on the broadest notion of cortical
organisation; however, the representational codes for a given layer are learned from the
input (see [19] for detailed explanation of the learning process, which itself is not central to
the results reported here, nor to the theoretical claim made here). The main advantage of
time-based binding is that it avoids the superposition problem that a system that only uses
synchronous firing alone would face.
In sum, the essential difference between DORA and other connectionist models is that
DORA binds representations using asynchrony of unit firing and thus can vary the level of
representation at which the asynchrony is maintained. Slight asynchrony in unit firing leads to
independent, discriminable sequences of representation across layers. Units on the next layer
of the network then code for or fire when two or more subunits fire within a certain time of
each other, which results in a hierarchical representation that can discriminate sequences with
the same inputs and represents input values independently. In this way, DORA learns struc-
tured representations of relations from unstructured (holistic flat feature vector) inputs and is
based on traditional connectionist computing principles (i.e., layers of interconnected nodes
passing activation via weighted connections that are modified via Hebbian learning). However,
in contrast with most connectionist networks, DORA effectively learns and implements hier-
archical symbolic representations [20,33]. As summarised above, DORA does this by using
time to encode relational information and uses comparisons of distribution of activity in time
to subset units into function representations and to continue refining them throughout the
A mechanism for linguistic cortical computation
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learning process [19]. DORA accounts for numerous phenomena from relational learning, as
well as its development (e.g., [19,34,35,36,37]).
Tracking hierarchical representations in language processing
Although there are seldom clear physical boundaries in speech input that directly correspond
to higher-level representations (i.e., phonemes, words, phrases, and sentences), we perceive
and experience complex discrete representations in continuous input. A growing body of evi-
dence suggests that this perception is based in the entrainment of cortical brain rhythms to
speech [3,5,6,7]. While such neuroimaging evidence is suggestive and its implications
Fig 1. A DORA representation of the proposition waste (games, time) during processing that illustrates how time-based binding works. We use
different shapes to represent units in different layers (ovals for Proposition node "P-units"/sentences, rectangles for Role-filler binding nodes or "RB units"/
phrases, triangles and large circles for Propositional Object (PO) units/words and argument roles, and small circles for semantic units/features) for the
purposes of clarity. Abbreviations "wtr." and "wtd." signify the role of waster and wasted in the proposition waste(games, time), respectively. In the model,
these units are simply nodes in different layers of the network. Darker units denote when a unit is firing at a given time step (panels a–d in the Fig 1), which in
this case corresponds to 250 msec/4 Hz. Please see page 18 for a detailed discussion of P-units, RB-units, and PO units.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.2000663.g001
A mechanism for linguistic cortical computation
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tantalising, there is a mechanistic gap between such cortical signals and the representational
output of the system (as described by formal theories, or as might be formalised in any compu-
tational system). An adequate mechanistic linking hypothesis between linguistic and cortical
computation would explain how the system goes from input of perceptual features to a hierar-
chy of structured representations and would describe how the computational mechanism gives
rise to the observed cortical activation states. Furthermore, such a hypothesis would shed light
on whether the observed cortical signal reflected “mere” tracking of hierarchical linguistic
representations or whether it, in fact, reflects the online generation of hierarchical linguistic
structure.
To carve the computational problem at its joints, we turn to Ding et al. [6], who report cor-
tical tracking of hierarchical linguistic structures (i.e., words, phrases, and sentences) in oscil-
latory data in both electrocorticography and magnetoencephalography recordings. Ding et al.
presented auditory strings of synthesised speech in Mandarin Chinese and American English.
Their stimuli were isochronous but manipulated the structural relationship between the sylla-
bles such that, in one condition, there was no meaningful relationship between the string of
syllables/words (“walk egg nine house”), in a second condition, phrases were formed from adja-
cent syllables (“flat table angry birds”), and in a third condition, sentences emerged (“new plans
gave hope”). An increase in power at frequencies in the oscillatory response on the timescale of
syllabic/lexical rate (4 Hz), phrasal rate (2 Hz), and sentential rate (1 Hz) tracked the hierarchy
of linguistic representation. Importantly, Ding et al. showed that the signal could not be attrib-
uted to entrainment to acoustic information, transitional probability, or word predictability
[6]. Finding cortical entrainment at these slower oscillations (1 Hz, 2 Hz) suggests that cortical
populations are entraining to abstract linguistic representations like phrases and sentences.
This is remarkable because it is unclear what, if any physical instantiation of these higher-level
stimuli are present in the speech signal—at least, there is no (known) set of acoustic cues in
speech that reliably or diagnostically signal word, phrase, and sentence structures. That Ding
et al. [6] found cortical entrainment to such higher-level linguistic structures suggests that the
brain is, nonetheless, sensitive to the presence of these abstract linguistic representations.
Strikingly, DORA predicts such a representational pattern in oscillatory unit firing. DORA
is a model of how information is represented—consequently, the simulations we present here
are in no way intended as a fully articulated model of parsing. Furthermore, we want to
emphasise that DORA represents a form of role-filler binding predicate calculus, in which
expressions can be, but are not always, nor even usually, formally equivalent to the natural lan-
guage expression. Future work is needed to derive representations in DORA with one-to-one
correspondence to natural language; however, for the sentence stimuli tested herein, the differ-
ence between natural language form of the expression and the DORAese predicate logic does
not bear on the theoretical conclusion that we draw from the results of our simulations. How-
ever, if the structure of information in DORA turned out to resemble how language appears to
be represented in the human brain, that finding would indicate mechanistic synergy between
the two computational systems.
We present simulations of sentence processing within a model of relational concept learn-
ing that provides a mechanistic explanation for how representational structure emerges from
unstructured input. We show that the model not only represents sentences and exhibits oscil-
latory activation patterns that are strikingly similar to human cortical oscillatory brain activity
during exposure to the same stimuli [6]. We further demonstrate that the model, as a result of
processing the sentence stimuli, forms representations of sentence meaning that reliably dis-
criminate between semantically composable grammatical sentences and syntactically intact
but semantically non-composable sentences. Our results, though not a model of parsing nor
of a cortical microcircuit, are an existence proof that using time to carry information (“time-
A mechanism for linguistic cortical computation
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based binding,” or generating explicit hierarchical representations by encoding structural rela-
tions in time) addresses two hard problems for cognition that have so far been investigated
entirely separately: sentence processing and analogy (see [19] for human-level simulations of
relational and analogical reasoning). In order to determine if the oscillatory pattern from Ding
et al. [6] can arise from the serial presentation of a stimulus at 4 Hz alone, we ran the same sim-
ulations in a RNN. The RNN simulations test whether signals like the cortical oscillations
observed by Ding et al. [6] can arise from a system without time-based binding or representa-
tional hierarchy, in which they might arise from seriality alone.
The current study
DORA processed the English sentence stimuli from Ding et al. [6], as well as three control con-
ditions wherein either only syntactic relationships, but no compositional meaning, were pres-
ent (Jabberwocky condition), no syntactic relationships existed between the words in the input
(Word List condition), or only phrases existed (a version of the phrase-only condition from
Ding et al., Phrases condition; please see [6] for the list of Grammatical Stimuli and S1 Text for
a list of our additional stimuli and Fig 2 for a schematic of Grammatical sentence representa-
tions in DORA’s predicate calculus). We observed whether DORA represented the phrases or
sentences correctly, and recorded the oscillatory pattern of unit firing in layers of DORA’s net-
work during processing. Finally, in contrast to available brain data, we assessed the content of
the representations DORA generated during processing of Grammatical and Jabberwocky sen-
tences. We plotted the activation of existing predicates in memory in response to the hierarchi-
cal representations that parsing generated in those two conditions. To discount the hypothesis
that the oscillatory pattern stems only from serialised processing, we repeated the four simula-
tions in a RNN for comparison. Please see the Methods section for a description of the RNN
that we trained. In brief, this was a standard RNN with one hidden layer that was trained on
the same stimuli as in the DORA simulations.
Fig 2. A representation of the sentence "Dry fur rubs skin" in Learning and Inference with Schemas
and Analogies (LISA; [21]) /DORAese predicate calculus. We use different shapes to represent units in
different layers (ovals for P-units/sentences, rectangles for RB units/phrases, triangles and large circles for
PO units/words, and small circles for semantic units/features) for the purpose of clarity. In the model, these
units are simply nodes in different layers of the network.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.2000663.g002
A mechanism for linguistic cortical computation
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Results
The results of the simulations are presented in Figs 3, 4 and 5. Interestingly, the oscillatory pat-
tern of firing in the various layers of DORA during processing of sentences, closely mirrored
the patterns observed by Ding et al. [6]. Specifically, just like the cortical signals, for Grammat-
ical sentences, DORA showed an activation burst that lasted throughout the processing of the
sentence (i.e., firing in the 1 Hz range), activation bursts at twice the rate of the whole sentence
burst (i.e., firing in the 2 Hz range), aligned with phrase-level processing, and activation bursts
at four times the rate of the whole sentence burst (i.e., firing in the 4 Hz range), corresponding
to word-level processing. However, the activity in the Word List condition also resembled the
human data, in which in both cases, there was only spiking at 4 Hz but not at slower frequen-
cies, which indicates that larger constituents were neither tracked nor formed in this condi-
tion. The Jabberwocky condition, which has no analogue in the available human data, resulted
in oscillations that resembled the Grammatical condition, suggesting that the model is sensi-
tive to something akin to syntactic structure or category during processing of Jabberwocky.
Finally, we had the model process the Phrases condition, which contained strings of phrases,
but not sentences, and it showed a power increase at 2 Hz and 4 Hz, resembling the human
data to a phrase-only condition in Ding et al. [6].
To assess the nature of the representations DORA generated during parsing, we plotted
activation maps of the contents of DORA’s memory over 100 trials (instances of processing a
sentence in the simulation) in the Grammatical and Jabberwocky conditions. Note that the
oscillatory firing pattern from the Word List condition indicated that DORA did not compose
role-filler bindings to compare with memory in that condition. The difference in activation of
existing representations in DORA’s memory between the Grammatical condition (Fig 3) and
Fig 3. Grammatical sentences: DORA network power spectrum compared to human cortical
oscillations. The solid line represents cortical power while participants listened to four syllable/word
sentences played over 1 s in Ding et al. [6]. Power increases are evident at the 1 Hz (sentence duration), 2 Hz
(phrase duration), and 4 Hz (word duration) range. The dashed line depicts firing in DORA while processing
the same sentences used in Ding et al. Units in DORA fire for the duration of the sentence, at intervals of half
the length of the sentence and at intervals lasting a quarter of the length of the sentence. Data from the
stimulation and the code to run it are available at https://osf.io/eb2vp/ and https://github.com/AlexDoumas/
dingetal_sent.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.2000663.g003
A mechanism for linguistic cortical computation
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Fig 4. DORA network power spectrum plot of the Word List, Phrases, and Jabberwocky conditions.
For Word List, an increase in firing only occurred at the 4 Hz range, corresponding to firing of nodes coding for
words. Lack of firing at other frequencies indicates that no hierarchical representations were processed in the
Word list condition. In the Phrases condition, there was an increase in power at 2 Hz and 4 Hz, indicating that
units coding words and units coding phrases were active during the processing of this condition. No sentence
units were active. In the Jabberwocky condition, there was an increase at 1, 2, and 4 Hz range, similar to the
pattern seen for grammatical sentences, indicating that hierarchical representations were indeed activated.
See Fig 5 for a comparison of activation across the propositions in the model’s long-term memory between
Jabberwocky and Grammatical sentences. Data from the simulations and the code to run them are available
at https://osf.io/eb2vp/ and https://github.com/AlexDoumas/dingetal_sent.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.2000663.g004
Fig 5. Left Panel: Grammatical. Plot of active propositions in memory across trials in the Grammatical condition. On the x-
axis are P-Units, on the y-axis are processing iterations of the model, equivalent to trials or instances of processing a sentence
during the simulation. The darker colour indicates more activation of existing propositional role-filler binding combinations in
memory. Grammatical sentences resulted in stronger activation of extant propositions than Jabberwocky sentences did. Right
Panel: Jabberwocky. The Jabberwocky condition did not activate as many single existing propositions in the model’s memory
as the Grammatical condition did, rather, activation was spread more broadly across memory, despite both conditions
producing similar oscillations in DORA. Data from the simulations and the code to run them are available at https://osf.io/
eb2vp/ and https://github.com/AlexDoumas/dingetal_sent.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.2000663.g005
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the Jabberwocky condition (Fig 4) are illustrated below (Fig 5). We plot only the activation of
propositions that contain a word that was present in the stimuli in these particular trials (0–
100). The darker bars indicate that the hierarchical representations formed during processing
more strongly activated representations that were already in the semantic memory of the
model. Jabberwocky sentences activated fewer existing token units and activated these units to
a lesser extent than the Grammatical sentences did, suggesting the model is generating novel,
syntactically licensed representations that are "representationally unusual," comparable to the
human experience of reading syntactically intact but semantically anomalous Jabberwocky
sentences. We performed a t-test comparing the number of units above threshold across the
100 runs in the Grammatical and Jabberwocky conditions and found that more units were
active while processing a Grammatical sentence (mean units active = 70.78) than a Jabber-
wocky sentence (mean units active = 31.95); t = 58.312, p< 2.2e−16.
We then repeated the four simulations in an RNN. In order to determine the activation
level of the RRNs at each frequency, we attempted to identify units in the trained RRNs output
layer that were active above a threshold of 0.7 consistently at 1 Hz, 2 Hz, 3 Hz, and 4 Hz across
all sentences in each condition (Fig 6). Activation in the hidden layer corresponds to represen-
tations of the statistical patterns that the network learns, so finding patterns here would
indicate that the RNN learned hierarchical linguistic structures from the input. For the Gram-
matical condition, zero units in the hidden layer were active at the 1 Hz, 2 Hz, and 3 Hz rates;
five units (out of 50 hidden units in the network) were active above the threshold at the 4 Hz
rate. For the Jabberwocky condition, zero units were active at the 1 Hz, 2 Hz, and 3 Hz rates;
nine units were active above the threshold at the 4 Hz rate. For the Word List condition, zero
units were active at the 1 Hz, 2 Hz, and 3 Hz rates; six units were active above the threshold at
the 4 Hz rate. For the Phrase condition, one unit was active at the 2 Hz rate; five hidden units
out of 30 nodes were active above the threshold at the 4 Hz rate. Fig 6 shows the proportion of
units (ranging from 0–0.2 proportion of units) active in the recurrent layer at each rate in each
condition. We not that the RNN achieved perfect performance, that is, it learned the sentences
such that for any input word, the RNN could tell you the next n words with 100% accuracy.
The difference between the RNN and DORA is that, in doing so, the RNN did not do anything
in a way that resembles what humans do, that is, it neither formed (symbolic) hierarchical rep-
resentations, nor oscillated, nor oscillated in a way that resembles the cortical signals to the
same stimuli.
Discussion
We have presented simulations from a computational model that learns and generates hierar-
chical structure from an unstructured string of lexical input. The model, DORA [19], was built
for a completely different purpose (learning relational concepts to perform analogical reason-
ing) but achieved the current outcome for sentence processing without any formal or struc-
tural changes from its original state. DORA learns and generates structured, symbolic
representations using time-based binding in a layered neural network [19]; it is this computa-
tional architecture that enables the model to process sentences, to form hierarchical represen-
tations in general, and is what gives rise to the oscillatory pattern that resembled cortical
oscillations. DORA is a model of how information is represented in the human mind, and per-
haps more speculatively, how information might be macroscopically represented in cortical
networks. It is not a model of parsing or cortical microcircuits. Nonetheless, when processing
sentences like fun games waste time, the English sentence stimuli from Ding et al. [6], the oscil-
latory firing pattern of units in various layers of DORA closely resembled the cortical oscilla-
tions observed by Ding et al. [6]—an activation burst lasting throughout the processing of the
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sentence (1 Hz range), activation bursts at phrase-level processing, or twice the rate of the
whole sentence burst (2 Hz range), and activation bursts at word-level processing, or around
four times the rate of the whole sentence burst (4 Hz range). Furthermore, the representations
that the model generated during parsing reliably reflected whether the sentence was grammati-
cal, jabberwocky, a list of phrases, or a list of words. This result indicates that DORA’s architec-
ture generates representations that are both semantically rich and structurally sensitive, two
properties that are essential to human language. In contrast, a traditional connectionist net-
work (an RNN) failed to show an oscillatory pattern that resembled the cortical signal, but a
Fig 6. Proportion of units (range: 0–0.2) active above threshold (0.7) in the recurrent layer of the RNNs. Note: total number of units
in the recurrent layer n = 50 for all conditions except for Phrases, in which n = 30. On average, between 5–9 units out of 50 in the hidden
layer activated at 4 Hz. There was no evidence of activity at 1 Hz or 2 Hz, and hence no evidence for coding or tracking of linguistic
structures in the RNN. Data from the simulations and the code to run the simulations are available at https://osf.io/eb2vp/ and https://github.
com/AlexDoumas/dingetal_sent.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.2000663.g006
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few nodes coded words at 4 Hz. Thus, there was no evidence of the RNN representing hierar-
chical linguistic structures. This contrast showed that seriality of processing alone is insuffi-
cient to produce the oscillatory pattern observed in humans and in DORA.
Our results naturally beg the converse question, as to whether any system with representa-
tional hierarchy could produce the oscillatory pattern of activation that [6] and DORA show.
For example, could natural language processing (NLP) parsers, which feature representational
hierarchy and were developed to specifically parse natural language in a machine, produce
oscillations and the pattern seen in [6] and in our simulations? In principle, any system of hier-
archy that is (de)compositional has the representational ingredients to encode units that could
be fired in a sequence. However, we would argue that any given representational hierarchy
could only produce oscillations if it were combined with time-based binding, which, as far as we
know, no NLP system features. In DORA, time-based binding is the oscillation of activity
throughout the network, which is part of the reason why the RNN did not show oscillatory
activity nor the specific pattern from [6]. The representational structure of DORA (a (de)com-
positional role-filler binding predicate logic) is what makes the oscillations take the form that
the data from [6] have. In terms of the specifics of the observed 1-2-4 Hz pattern, both [6] and
our simulations are highly shaped by the word presentation rate of 250 ms/4 Hz. But without
time-based binding, there is no mechanism to produce oscillations in a network, even in a
NLP parser or other system with representational hierarchy.
In sum, we remain relatively agnostic about the specific details of the required representa-
tional hierarchy because we do not yet know how to link the predicate calculus representations
we use to natural language mental and cortical representations. What we are not agnostic
about is the need for asynchronous time-based binding in order to produce oscillations in a
neural network, as well as the need for representational hierarchy to produce the particular
pattern of oscillations observed here and in [6].
Furthermore, another difference between DORA, RNNs, and NLP parsers is that DORA is
a model of how information is represented and computed in the human mind. In other words,
DORA makes a specific theoretical claim about how the human mind represents (some kinds
of) information—that is, it does so in a relational, structured, hierarchical manner, which is
realised via time-based binding. RNNs and NLP parsers do not make such theoretical claims
about the architectures and mechanisms of mental and cortical computation.
In DORA, structured representations form during learning and become activated during
later processing. Our simulations and theoretical claims concern the way in which information
is activated during processing. However, we note that it is the same computational mechanism
that can generate representations during learning, which also performs processing: the use of
time to carry information about the relations between inputs, implemented as systematic tem-
poral asynchrony of unit firing across layers of the network, which we have called "time-based
binding." Through temporal asynchrony of firing, the model can use separable populations of
units to maintain activation of different levels of representation as they occur in time. This
ability to maintain hierarchy is the computational feature that turns out to be crucial for repre-
senting and processing the kinds of relations that are necessary to represent human language
and is likely to be necessary for generating hierarchical levels of representation in any cortical
network. We note here that our argument that temporal asynchrony is the mechanism that
gives rise to hierarchical representation finds traction also in the conceptual terminology of
neural oscillations, namely that temporal asynchrony corresponds to neural desynchronisa-
tion. Importantly, synchrony and asynchrony of unit firing in time are not orthogonal mecha-
nisms; in fact, they are the same function or variable with different input values (e.g., sin(x)
and sin(2x)) that can carry different information (see [38]). Our mechanistic claim is that it is
asynchrony that allows the system to bind information for processing while maintaining (de)
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compositionality and generating hierarchical representations. Binding or forming representa-
tions through synchrony alone would fail at the superposition problem, effectively superim-
posing a variable and its value onto a single, undecomposable representation.
The generation of structured representations in DORA is a form of predication [19].
DORA’s representations are symbolic predicates that code for the invariant relations between
features and objects (e.g., between the features “fun” and the object “games,” the feature
“adjective” and the object “fun,” or the feature “noun” and the object “games”), or between
objects and each other (e.g., between the object “fun games” and the object “waste” [19,39]).
The resulting computational architecture thus explicitly represents invariant relations between
input representations (or variables) and output representations (or values), as a function. This
architecture is in contrast with RNNs and current deep-learning algorithms, which associate
input and output via statistical association and, therefore, do not (currently) preserve composi-
tionality or represent relational structures [20,25,26,30,40,41]. Because DORA explicitly codes
invariance as a function, it can combine novel inputs with existing predicate structures, leading
to productive, combinatorial generativity of representation that is neither maligned by viola-
tions of statistical regularity, and not reliant, in principle, although not demonstrated here, on
hard coding of representations (cf. [42]). Though not directly relevant to the claims we make
here, DORA is able to learn hierarchical structure from unstructured input—a feature that is
very important for any developmentally plausible model of cognition and to models that seek
to explain cortical and biological system organisation and plasticity. The ability to learn struc-
tured representations contrasts with current Bayesian models, which assume structured repre-
sentations a priori or fit them from a specified space of possible representations predefined by
the modeller (cf. [42]). Although Bayesian models have a powerful descriptive application,
they do not currently offer a mechanistic explanation for how a biological system came to be
the way it is.
What are the computational origins of predication, and where does it fall in the taxonomy
of cortical computations? What might those origins tell us about why a model of analogy hap-
pens to be able to process sentences? Perhaps communicating information across time and
space or needing to code for a relationship between representations that goes beyond, or even
violates, statistical regularity (such as encountering novel objects and interacting with them, or
interacting with old objects in new ways) were challenges that were sufficient to recruit a latent
computational mechanism from existing neurocomputational subroutines, in response to the
common computational requirement that these problems entailed. One hypothesis is that the
underlying computation behind predication is a domain-general abstraction mechanism, such
that language processing and analogical reasoning are instances of processing that call upon
the same abstraction subroutine, one that might also underlie other “binding”-like phenomena
in cognition and perception [13,27], in any neural system that requires relationality or repre-
sentational hierarchy. An abstraction sub-routine might be a cognitive or computational
mechanistic “kind” that is at work in much of human cognition [9,11,22,23,32,43].
Our results suggest a formal and mechanistic synergy between how representational struc-
tures are computed, and how energy is expended in both cortical and machine oscillators. The
pattern of oscillatory activation observed in the layers of DORA arises directly from the online
processing of hierarchical sentence representations—by inductive inference, the cortical signal
reflects generation too, rather than “mere” tracking, of hierarchical linguistic representation.
Time-based binding via asynchrony, the computational mechanism in our model, links the
generation of hierarchical structure to the observable “read-out” in the machine and cortical
signal, with broad implications as a computational first principle of cognition in the human
brain. Minimally, it explains how a computation gives rise to hierarchical representation and
why cortical signals stemming from said computation appear the way they do. As such, our
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results can make the broad prediction that there ought to be temporally dissociable popula-
tions oscillating asynchronously; that is, desynchronisation between neural assemblies should
occur as a function of the level of linguistic analysis that is being represented in a cortical net-
work at a given time step. In other words, DORA’s representational architecture predicts
desynchronisation between assemblies oscillating at different frequencies in order to represent,
for example, the speech envelope, acoustic phonetic features, syllables/phonemes, morphemes,
words, phrases, and sentences. Whether the cross-frequency desynchronisation signal is more
strongly observable at stimulus onset and offset or whether representational (de)synchronisa-
tion signals should be thought of as the dynamics of phase-to-power cross-frequency coupling
over time, as well as a myriad of other important complications, are difficult to predict con-
cretely at this stage. But, it is likely that functional characterisation of the dynamic recruitment
or entrainment of cell assemblies during information processing could reveal powerful mecha-
nistic first principles of cortical representation and computation [32,38].
Our results support a view where the organisational principles of cognitive, cortical, and
biological systems arise from the nature of the mechanisms that carry out the computations
that the system must perform. Our results provide a mechanistic explanation for (1) how our
brains form discrete hierarchical representations from holistic unstructured input, as in lan-
guage comprehension and other domains of cognition, (2) how patterns in cortical oscillations
relate to representational structure building, and (3) how the system exploits the fact that time
carries information to achieve a representational system that is generative and (de)composi-
tional. The mechanism that gives rise to this state of affairs is time-based binding—the
asynchrony of unit firing across layers of the network that allows the model to represent infor-
mation independently at multiple timescales. The class of possible processing mechanisms that
accounts for the output of the cortical computation signal must correspond in some funda-
mental way to the mechanism through which DORA forms representations. This computa-
tional mechanism gives rise to a generative representational hierarchy, as observed in machine
and cortical oscillations, serving as an “abstraction engine” for representation in the human
brain. Our results suggest that the identification of biological mechanisms, circuits, and sub-
routines that can perform computations beyond the domain in which they arose, or from
which they were derived—a form of computational "recycling"—offers an approach to under-
standing biological systems, that, through modelling, can derive mechanistic explanations for
why systems are the way they are.
Methods
DORA is a model of how structured relational representations can be learned and represented
in a connectionist network. Starting with unstructured representations of objects (i.e., flat fea-
ture vectors), DORA learns structured (i.e., predicated) representations of object properties
and relations. Importantly, these representations allow DORA to solve a number of problems
in analogical and inductive reasoning [19].
For the purposes of the simulations described in this paper, DORA’s learning is not funda-
mental and so we avoid discussing it further for the purposes of clarity of exposition. It should
be noted, however, that all of the propositional structures we describe and use in the simula-
tions can be learned by DORA from scratch. Full details of how these propositions might be
learned are given in Doumas et al. [19]. Prior to the simulations, we hardcoded DORA with
the Grammatical stimuli from Ding et al., from which it learned propositional sentence struc-
tures. For the simulations, we had DORA process stimuli in the different conditions after it
had learned and stored sentence structures in its memory.
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There are two aspects of DORA’s operation that are fundamental to the current simula-
tions. The first is the manner in which DORA represents propositional structures (sentences)
and role-filler bindings (phrases). The second is the manner in which activation spreads from
propositions currently in DORA’s focus of attention to propositions in long-term memory
(LTM). We describe both of these operations in the sections that follow.
Representations in DORA
In DORA, before learning (although again, not demonstrated here), objects are represented as
flat feature vectors (see Fig 7). After learning, relational structures are represented by a hierarchy
of distributed and localist codes (see Figs 1, 2 and 8). At the bottom, “semantic” units represent
the features of objects and roles in a distributed fashion. At the next level, these distributed rep-
resentations are connected to localist units (called POs in DORA) representing individual predi-
cates (or roles) and objects; in these simulations, these units represent words. Localist RBs link
object and predicate units into role-filler binding pairs for processing; these units represent
Fig 7. Initial state of the network before learning. The model assumes the existence of objects and
features and initially must learn the relationships between features sets and objects. After learning, the
model’s internal representations are in a predicate calculus (see Figs 1 and 2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.2000663.g007
Fig 8. Graphical depiction of banks of units in DORA containing represented propositional structures. The comparison process that is crucial for
learning occurs across the driver and recipient (see [19] for details).
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.2000663.g008
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phrases in these simulations. At the top of the hierarchy, a localist P-unit that represents the sen-
tence links RBs (phrases) into a whole relational proposition or sentence (see Figs 1 and 2).
The token units at the various layers of DORA represent information at a progressively
more conjunctive level. While independence of roles and filler is maintained in the semantic
and PO units, RB units code conjunctively for specific phrases or role-filler bindings, and P-
units code for conjunctions of role-filler sets into full relational propositions, or sentences in
this case. Conjunctive binding is sufficient for long-term storage but violates role-filler inde-
pendence and so fails fundamentally for any tasks that require independent representation of
roles and fillers [20,44], as processing hierarchical and symbolic structure requires that repre-
sentational elements in a system can be composed into structures in a manner that does not
violate the independence of those elements (see [26,40]). Consequently, during structured pro-
cessing, DORA must maintain binding information in those units (semantics and POs) that
maintain role-filler independence.
DORA is composed of a number of sets or banks of units (see Fig 8). The driver is the cur-
rent focus of attention, or what DORA is thinking about, at any given moment. The recipient
is a set of units representing propositions that are available for comparison with the proposi-
tions in the driver. Hummel and Holyoak [45] have described the recipient in terms of Cow-
an’s [46] active memory. Finally, LTM is the set of propositions that DORA has encountered
in the past that are not currently active. All banks of units are connected via a common pool of
semantic units. During processing, activation flows from units in the driver, to the semantic
units, and then to units in the recipient and LTM. The flow of activation from driver to recipi-
ent is fundamental for a number of DORA’s operations, including analogical mapping, infer-
ence, and predicate learning and refinement. The flow of activation from driver to LTM is
important for retrieval. None of the current simulations rely on operations involving flow of
activation between driver and recipient, so we do not discuss the recipient set any further.
The driver, as the focus of DORA’s attention, is the starting point for all of DORA’s process-
ing. When DORA performs any structured processing, role-filler bindings must be maintained
in the units that maintain role-filler independence (see above). This dynamic binding (bind-
ings that do not violate role-filler independence and can be created and destroyed on the fly
[20]) information is carried in DORA using time. Specifically, DORA uses systematic asyn-
chrony of firing to maintain role-filler bindings.
In DORA, binding information can be carried either by synchrony (as in the symbolic-con-
nectionist model Learning and Inference with Schemas and Analogies [LISA] [21]) or by
systematic asynchrony of firing, with bound role-filler pairs firing in direct sequence. Asyn-
chrony-based binding, or what we call "time-based binding," allows roles and fillers to be
coded by the same pool of semantic units, which allows DORA to learn representations of rela-
tions from representations of objects (Doumas et al. [19]). During asynchronous binding, in
which a proposition like waste (games, time) becomes active in the driver (see Fig 8), the units
representing waster fire (along with units conjunctively coding for waster+games and for the
waste [games, time] proposition; see Fig 1A), followed directly by the units representing games
(along with units conjunctively coding for waster+games and for the waste [games, time] prop-
osition; see Fig 1B), representing the binding of waster to games.
Then, the units representing wasted fire (along with units conjunctively coding for wasted
+time and for the waste (game, time) proposition; see Fig 1C), followed directly by the units
representing time (along with units conjunctively coding for wasted+time and for the waste
[time, games] proposition; see Fig 1D), representing the binding of wasted to time. In short,
bound role-filler pairs fire in direct sequence and out of synchrony with other bound role-filler
pairs. These patterns of sequential oscillation dynamically code role-filler bindings in DORA
and underlie DORA’s capacity to use the representations that it learns to support relational
A mechanism for linguistic cortical computation
PLOS Biology | DOI:10.1371/journal.pbio.2000663 March 2, 2017 17 / 23
reasoning (e.g., analogical mapping, schema induction, and relational induction; see [19]) and
to learn structured relational representations from unstructured object representations.
While establishing time-sharing patterns of firing in a connectionist model might seem
complicated, as demonstrated by Hummel and Holyoak [21,45] and Doumas et al. [19], it is
actually rather simple. In DORA, each token unit is actually a coupling of two units, an exciter
and a yoked inhibitor. The exciter unit behaves like a conventional node in a neural network,
taking and passing input to units at higher and lower levels and laterally inhibiting and being
inhibited by units in the same layer. Each exciter is also yoked to an inhibitor unit that inte-
grates input over time and, when a threshold is reached, forces the yoked exciter unit to inac-
tivity, allowing other units to become active.
Continuing the above example, when the phrase/RB unit coding for waster+games fires, the
two word/PO units connected to that phrase/RB—waster and games—compete to become
active. Due to noise in the system, one of these tokens will become slightly more active and
inhibit the other to inactivity. For example, waster might become slightly more active and
inhibit games to inactivity. After some time firing, waster’s inhibitor unit will fire, forcing it to
inactivity and allowing the word/PO representing games to fire. Similarly, after some time fir-
ing, the inhibitor yoked to the phrase/RB unit coding waster+games will fire, forcing that unit
to inactivity and allowing another phrase/RB (e.g., wasted+time) to fire. Establishing the pat-
tern of firing described above requires units in different layers firing at different timescales.
This pattern can be achieved in any number of ways, the simplest being setting the threshold
of the inhibitor units appropriately (e.g., word/PO inhibitors have half the firing threshold of
phrase/RB inhibitors). In DORA, inhibitor units of words/POs integrate input both from their
yoked exciter and from the exciters of all units in the above layers (e.g., phrases/RBs). Conse-
quently, words/POs naturally oscillate at twice the frequency of phrases/RBs.
Crucially, sequential firing of related constituent elements is a necessary property of bind-
ing via synchrony and systematic asynchrony. When DORA performs any structured process-
ing, a pattern will invariably emerge wherein bound elements within a larger compositional
proposition will fire in direct sequence and at a different timescale than units coding for
conjunctions of independently bound elements and full propositional compounds. In the fol-
lowing section, we show that the pattern of activation produced by DORA as it processes com-
positional structures very closely matches the temporal pattern of spike activity observed in
Ding et al. [6] when people process sentences.
Simulation of Ding et al. [6]
We simulated the Ding et al. [6] studies using the same English sentences used in their Experi-
ments 5 and 6 (with native English speakers). All of these sentences took the form modifier-
noun-verb-noun, forming sentences like “new plans give hope,” “fun games waste time,” and
“dry fur rubs skin.” DORA can represent hierarchical propositions by representing proposi-
tional structures as arguments of other propositional structures. For example, to represent
“dry fur rubs skin,” the modified noun phrase “dry fur” can be represented explicitly by the
propositional structure dry (fur), which can then serve as the argument of the agent role of the
rubs relation (see Fig 2; details of higher-order structure representation in LISA, from which
DORA is descended, and from DORA can be found in Hummel & Holyoak [21] and in Dou-
mas et al. [19] respectively).
To simulate Ding et al.’s main experimental procedure, we allowed DORA to process Ding
et al.’s English sentences one at a time, using the representations of those sentences. Represen-
tations of the sentence structures (e.g., Figs 1 and 2) entered the driver (i.e., were attended to).
We then activated these sentence structures one word at a time. That is, we activated the
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semantic units encoding the first word for 110 iterations, then the second word for 110 itera-
tions, and so forth. As semantic units became active, they passed activation to token units in
the driver. The units in the driver responded to the pattern of firing in the semantic units (i.e.,
the units fired to represent and encode binding information; see Fig 8).
To simulate Ding et al.’s control condition we allowed DORA to process Ding et al.’s ran-
dom word sequences one at a time. In this Word List condition, there were no syntactic rela-
tionships between words. Representations of the sentence word sequence entered the driver
(i.e., were attended to). DORA processed the word as it normally would (i.e., the units coding
each term fired, but because the sequence of words included no propositional structure, only
word/PO units fired during processing). We tracked firing rate of all the nodes in the driver as
DORA processed the sentences. The results of the simulation and the comparison to the pat-
terns observed by Ding et al. are presented in Fig 3. Interestingly, the pattern of firing of the
nodes in the various layers of DORA very closely mirror the patterns observed by Ding et al.
Specifically, just like the human participants, DORA showed an activation burst only at the
rate of word representation, or four times the rate of the whole sentence burst (i.e., the word/
PO units firing in the 4 Hz range).
Retrieval and activation of LTM
DORA, like LISA, performs memory retrieval by firing propositions in the driver and allowing
activation to flow to LTM via the shared semantic units. Units in LTM respond to the pattern of
activation in the semantic units imposed by the units in the driver and are retrieved into active
memory (the recipient) via a Luce [47] choice function (see Doumas et al. [19]). For example,
when DORA is "thinking about" how games waste time, and the proposition wastes (games,
time) becomes active in the driver, activation will flow through the semantic units to units in
LTM that share semantic overlap with the word/PO units becoming active in the driver (i.e.,
wasters, wasted-things, games, time, and things like them). We used this property of the model
to further test whether the model is representing syntactic structure. We had DORA to process
versions of Ding et al.’s word sequences in the Word List condition (please see S1 Text), and we
created a Jabberwocky condition where there were only syntactic relationships between words
but no typical compositional semantic relationships. Representations of the sentence word
sequence entered the driver (i.e., were attended to). DORA processed the sentences one word at
a time (i.e., the units fired to represent and encode binding information, as above). We tracked
firing rate of all the nodes in the driver as DORA processed the sentences. The results of the
simulation and the comparison to the patterns observed in the experimental conditions are in
Figs 3, 4, 5 and 6. Ding et al. also manipulated a form of constituency—the linguistic relation-
ship between discrete units and larger units, in this case, between syllables and words—to deter-
mine if there was evidence for cortical tracking of these various units. They found that words
with multiple syllables elicited oscillations that tracked with the duration of the phrase bound-
ary, not just syllables, which were fixed at 250 ms or 4 Hz. Ding et al. found 2 Hz and 4 Hz activ-
ity for two disyllabic words that together formed a phrase (a stimulus stream of (xx)(xx), but no
1 Hz activity. Since DORA does not have the perceptual apparatus to process auditory signals,
we created a text analogue of the phrase condition (Phrases condition).
Simulations in a RNN
To test whether the oscillatory pattern observed by Ding et al. and in our DORA simulations
can be observed in a system without time-based binding and without representational hierar-
chy, we repeated all four simulations in a RNN implemented in Theano [48]. The network had
one hidden layer (see Fig 9).
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Sentence and word coding. In order to train the RNNs in the current simulations, two
encoding systems were used. In the input encoding system, each word was assigned a ran-
domly generated vector of zeros and ones of size ten. One additional 1-valued vector of size
ten was used to represent the beginning of any sentence.
In the output encoding system, a localist representation was used instead. For this, each
word was assigned a randomly chosen one-hot vector of size n = 333, where 333 is the number
of different words across datasets plus one word for the end of the sentence marker. In this sys-
tem, then, unit i = 1 represents word i, and the rest of the units are zeros.
Network architecture. The RNN used for the simulations described here consisted of
three layers of units: input, recurrent, and output (see Fig 9). Input layers have ten units. Out-
put layers have 333 units, one unit per word in the dataset plus one extra unit for the “end of
the sentence” word. Recurrent layers have (number of words per phrase  ten) units. The net-
work processed the input sequence over t (number of words per phrase) time steps, receiving
one word per time step. The input layer activation at time step t corresponds to the random
generated vector of zeros and ones of size ten that was associated with the word in the input
encoding scheme. The activation in the recurrent and output layers of the RNN is calculated
according to:
st ¼ tanhðUxt þWst  1Þ
ot ¼ softmaxðVstÞ
where st and ot are the activation vectors at time step t of the recurrent and output layers;
U, V, and W are the input, recurrent, and output weight matrices. The softmax function
f ðziÞ ¼ e
ziP
j
ezj
results in a vector of activations that sum to one and can be interpreted as proba-
bilities. Since a localist representation was used in the output layer, each element i of ot is the
network’s estimated probability that word i will be the input at time step t + 1.
Network training. For each condition (Grammatical, Jabberwocky, Word List, Phrases),
the RNN was presented with the sentences, one word by time step, and was trained to predict
Fig 9. Architecture of the three-layer RNN. x, s, and o represent vectors of activation of units in the input,
recurrent, and output layers, respectively. U, V, and W represent input, output, and recurrent weight matrices,
respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.2000663.g009
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the next word in the current sentence. The prediction of the network was taken to be the index
of the output unit with maximum activation.
For all conditions, the input sentences always had the form (“beginning” “word_1”
“word_2”. . .“word_n”), while the criterion sentences always had the form (“word_1”
“word_2”. . .”word_n” “end”). Since the first word of the sentence could not be predicted from
the beginning vector, the recurrent state activations s resulting from feeding the beginning vec-
tor to the RNNs were discarded and are not discussed further.
The RNNs were trained with gradient descent and adaptive learning rate. The learning rate
decreased to half its magnitude every time the cost increased (the initial learning rate was set
to 0.005 for all conditions except for the Only NPs condition in which it was set to 0.01). All
RNNs were trained for 150 epochs, at which point the network achieved perfect classification.
The loss function used for training was cross-entropy.
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